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This article explores the guidance that international and European organizations, such 
as the Council of Europe and the European Union, have developed regarding the remit, 
governance and funding of public service media. It argues that considerable work has 
now been done to identify concrete measures that can help to protect public service 
broadcasters from external political or commercial pressures and assist them in fulfilling 
their public service missions. Although these standards are by now well established they 
receive very variable recognition in the 14 Mediadem countries studied. The authors 
suggest that effective implementation of these international guidelines can help to 
support, even if they cannot guarantee, media independence over time. There is thus 
room for improvement and mutual learning across all systems, whether those 
emphasizing political pluralism or the virtues of a more technocratic, professional 
system of governance. 
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States have been heavily involved in the regulation of radio and television broadcasting from 
their inception. This stemmed in part from the technical characteristics of the medium, notably limited 
radio spectrum, but also from government awareness of broadcasting’s potential social and political 
influence, leading many European countries to establish state or government-controlled broadcasting 
organizations during the early years of the 20th century (Short, 1983, p. 30). Though state ownership is 
often associated with public service broadcasting, it is neither a necessary nor defining characteristic, and 
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may compromise the broadcaster’s independence. Rather, a number of specific purposes and distinct 
characteristics have been identified as essential components of public service broadcasting (PSB) in 
international documents and academic commentaries. 
 
In recent years most public service broadcasters (PSBs) have started to employ the Internet and 
other digital platforms to relay their services, so that it is often more accurate to employ the term “public 
service media” (PSM) rather than PSB. The Council of Europe (CoE) considers the term PSM to indicate a 
welcome transition on the part of PSBs to organizations that provide a more diverse range of content and 
services (CoE, 2012; see Note 1). PSM is here used in a broad sense to cover all media services that fulfill 
public service obligations, whether transmitted over traditional broadcast networks or via digital 
distribution platforms and networks. 
 
In this article we consider the international standards relating to the provision of PSM, noting, in 
particular, the importance that these documents ascribe to the independence of PSM from both political 
and commercial pressures (CoE, 2007a, Section II.c). We then outline the legal, financial and institutional 
arrangements that determine the governance of PSM in the 14 countries studied in the Mediadem project 
(Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain, Turkey, and the UK) and consider how well the international standards are reflected in practice, 
focusing on three main areas: the management and supervision, financing, and remit of PSM.  
 
International and European Guidelines on Public Service Media 
 
Legal Framework 
 
The countries considered in this article are all members of the CoE and signatories to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). They are also members of the United Nations and 
UNESCO, the specialized UN agency concerned with economic, social, and cultural affairs. All the countries 
except Turkey are members of the European Union (EU) and are thus bound to comply with the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFR) when operating within the scope of EU law. Although 
many of the international documents relating to PSM, such as CoE resolutions and recommendations, are 
advisory only, they set standards that member states should strive to realize in the domestic context. 
Although the decision to pursue public service objectives in the communications field and the scale of any 
such intervention is largely a political matter for each state, such decisions need to be understood in the 
context of this framework of international rules and guidelines.  
 
The 2005 UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions confirms the rights of state parties to “formulate and implement their cultural policies” 
(UNESCO, 2005, Art. 5.1) and to adopt “measures aimed at enhancing diversity of the media, including 
through public service broadcasting” (Art. 6.2(h)).1 At CoE level, the establishment of PSBs has been held 
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) to restrict freedom of expression guaranteed by Article 
10 ECHR by excluding private operators but also to be capable of justification where designed to promote 
                                                 
1 The EU and all countries studied, except Turkey, have acceded to, or ratified, this Convention.  
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pluralism and when proportionate (ECtHR, 1993). More recently, the ECtHR has emphasized that the state 
is under a positive duty, particularly regarding the audio-visual media, to guarantee “effective pluralism” 
(ECtHR, 2012, para. 134), while access to free and independent media from diverse sources is now 
considered a prerequisite for realizing freedom of expression and information under Αrticle 10 ECHR 
(ECtHR, 2009, para. 100). PSM are seen as playing an important role in guaranteeing such a plural media 
environment (CoE, 1982, 1996, Explanatory Memorandum, paras. 1–4; ECtHR, 2009, para. 100).  
 
The EU is committed to respecting “the freedom and pluralism of the media” and cultural 
diversity (Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, TFEU; Articles 11 and 22 
CFR). At the same time, competition law and internal market rules enable the EU to review the operation 
of public service organizations to prevent any unduly restrictive or discriminatory effects on trade (Court 
of Justice, 2007). The Protocol on the System of Public Broadcasting in the Member States to the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2009 expressly notes that public service broadcasting is directly related to the democratic, 
social, and cultural needs of each society and to the need to preserve media pluralism. It also confirms the 
competence of the member states to provide funding for such services. International and European law 
thus recognize the legitimacy and indeed desirability of PSM, but require state intervention to be both 
effective and proportionate. 
 
Endorsement of a Broad View of PSM 
 
The CoE has endorsed a broad view of PSM in relation to both programming and platforms. 
Concerning programming, the Parliamentary Assembly has called on states to “guarantee at least one 
comprehensive wide-ranging service comprising information, education, culture and entertainment” (CoE, 
2009, para. 7). The Assembly also concluded that PSBs should be able to diversify their services “through 
thematic channels, on-demand media, recorded media and Internet-based media services in order to offer 
a comprehensive and competitive range of media services” (CoE, 2009, para. 9). The Committee of 
Ministers has called for PSM to respond positively to audience expectations of enhanced choice and control 
stemming from digital developments (CoE, 2012, para. 6). 
 
The EU has similarly accepted a broad view of PSM. Both the Court of First Instance (now, 
General Court) and European Commission have expressly confirmed that an obligation to provide a 
balanced and varied broadcasting offer will generally be legitimate (Court of First Instance, 2008a, paras. 
201, 204; Court of First Instance, 2008b, paras. 194–201; European Commission, 2009, para. 47). The 
Commission has stated that PSM may provide services that are not “programs” in the traditional sense, 
provided they address the same democratic, social, and cultural needs (European Commission, 2001, 
para. 34) and that “the public service remit may also reflect the. . . diversification of activities in the 
digital age” (European Commission, 2009, paras. 47, 81). The European Parliament (EP) has endorsed 
public service operators taking advantage of new distribution platforms (EP, 2010, para. 14; EP, 2013, 
para. 12). 
 
The broad remit identified above has brought PSM into conflict with commercial operators. In the 
context of the CoE there is as yet little guidance as to when the scale or reach of new PSM services could 
conflict with Article 10 ECHR. At EU level, the Commission has stated that it will question the PSB remit 
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only where the state has made a “manifest error” of judgment (European Commission, 2009, para. 48), 
with terms falling out with the democratic, social, and cultural objectives identified in the Lisbon Protocol 
on Public Service Broadcasting. Commercial broadcasters and publishers have nevertheless referred a 
series of complaints to the Commission on the basis that public funding of PSB/PSM constitutes state aid 
contrary to article 107 TFEU (Craufurd Smith, 2008, pp. 44–49; Donders, 2012; Donders & Pauwels, 
2011; European Commission, 2001, 2009). In response, the Commission has pressed for all new public 
services to be assessed in terms of their potential commercial impact and public benefit using a “public-
value” test (Donders, 2012; Donders & Pauwels, 2011; European Commission, 2009, para. 84). While 
these requirements encourage a clearer articulation of public service goals, creating greater certainty for 
industry, they may result in further bureaucracy and a reactive market failure approach to the scope of 
public provision (EP, 2010, para. 16).  The Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE has expressed concern at 
the potential of EU law to constrain “member states’ powers to adapt the public service broadcasting remit 
to their own national needs” (CoE, 2009, para. 10).  
  
Independence and Governance 
 
The CoE considers that the “first priority” for PSM must be to ensure that their “culture, policies, 
processes and programming reflect and ensure” editorial independence and operational autonomy (CoE, 
2006; CoE, 2012, paras. 2, 21 see also EP, 2013, paras. 2, 8). Editorial independence is defined as “the 
right of public service broadcasting organizations to determine the content of their programmes freely and 
without interference from any external authority, within the limits prescribed by law or other rules in order 
to safeguard legitimate rights and interests” (CoE, 1996, Explanatory Memorandum, paras. 9 and 20; see 
also CoE, 2011, para. 81; CoE, 2012, para. 2). Operational autonomy involves the right of PSM to 
organize their activities freely, within the limits prescribed by law and appropriate supervisory constraints 
(CoE, 1996, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 11). Below we consider in more detail what international 
organizations have held independence to entail in relation to the remit, institutional structure, and funding 
of PSM. 
 
Remit 
 
Both the body empowered to set and review the remit of public service operators and the remit 
itself must be clearly determined (CoE, 2009, paras. 16, 17; CoE, 2012, paras. 15, 25; European 
Commission, 2009a, paras. 45, 60). The process by which this remit is defined and reviewed should be 
transparent, providing adequate scope for consultation with relevant interest groups, notably, citizens and 
Parliament. This can enable public service operators to draw on public support and strengthen their 
position in key negotiations (Levy, 2012).  
 
The principles of editorial independence and institutional autonomy should be explicitly embodied 
in the legal framework governing PSM (CoE, 1996, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 9; EP, 2013, para. 2). 
This should clarify that independence extends to the definition of program schedules; conception and 
production of programs; editing and presentation of news and current affairs programs; organization of 
activities; and recruitment of staff (CoE, 2006, Appendix I). In particular, PSM should be able to express 
the widest spectrum of views and opinions, governed by the principles of balance and impartiality (CoE, 
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1996, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 68; EP, 2013, para. 8). All political parties should have sufficient 
airtime to present their views, and PSM should not be required to transmit official public messages, 
declarations, or communications except in “exceptional circumstances” (CoE, 1996, Explanatory 
Memorandum VI).  
 
Structure, Supervision, and Regulatory Framework 
 
The 1996 CoE Recommendation on the guarantee of the independence of PSB states that PSBs 
should be organized so as to limit the possibility of outside influence. The Recommendation suggests a 
two-tier structure, consisting of a board of management and a supervisory body (CoE, 1996, Appendices 
II and III). The legal framework governing the status of both the board of management and the 
supervisory body should be structured to avoid any risk of political or other interference (CoE, 2000). The 
board of management should be solely responsible for the day-to-day operation of the organization and, 
editorially, for program schedules and output. The independent supervisory body, to which the board 
should be solely answerable, except where appropriate to the courts, should have no prior control over 
programming or involvement in the day-to-day management of the organization (CoE, 2000, para. 19; 
IFJ, 1999, p. 2; Mendel, 2011, p. 15). The EP has also called on member states to guarantee the 
independence of media councils and regulatory bodies “from the political influence of the government, the 
parliamentary majority or any other group in society” (EP, 2013, para. 2).  This is also reflected in the 
proposed revision of the EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive to include a new Article 30 requiring 
member States to designate “one or more independent national regulatory authorities” in the audiovisual 
field (European Commission, 2016, Article 1(21))   
 
The responsibilities of the management and supervisory bodies need to be clearly set out in 
advance so as to avoid both perceived and actual conflicts of interest. Members of either body should not 
have interests in related fields, such as shareholdings or directorates in media outlets, which could 
influence their judgment (CoE, 1996, Appendices II.2 and III.2; CoE, 2000, para. 4). The CoE considers 
that representatives appointed by the government or parliament may sit on the board of management 
(CoE, 2000, p. 26; CoE, 2012, p. 25), but such individuals must be able to exercise their functions 
independently and should not be able to exert a dominant influence over the board (CoE, 1996, 
Explanatory Memorandum, para. 24). The supervisory body should be independent from the state in its 
decision-making capacity and should represent collectively the interests of society in general. Although 
state involvement in appointments to the highest supervisory or decision-making levels may be acceptable 
as long as dominance of one interest group is avoided, the CoE concludes that this “should not normally 
extend to appointments at executive or editorial management level” (CoE, 2012, para. 27).  The risk of 
outside influence will be reduced by recourse to an open public tender; with appointments made in a 
transparent manner on the basis of specified, relevant, criteria published in advance.  
 
The EP has similarly emphasized the importance of transparent mechanisms for the selection and 
appointment of “public media heads, management boards, media councils and regulatory bodies” that are 
based on merit and “ensure professionalism, integrity and independence, as well as maximum consensus 
in terms of representing the entire political and social spectrum” (EP, 2013, para. 2). The recruitment, 
promotion and transfer of staff “should not depend on origin, sex, opinions or political, philosophical or 
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religious beliefs or trade union membership” (CoE, 1996, Appendix IV), though international organizations 
have indicated the desirability of staff being generally representative of the diversity of political trends or 
society’s constituent groups (IFJ, 1999, 2; CoE, 2011, para.83; CoE, 2012, para. 34). While staff should 
not be subject to instruction from entities out with the public service operator, they should be free to join 
a trade union (CoE, 1996, Explanatory Memorandum Guidelines 15-16). To avoid the risk of actual or 
perceived bias the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) considers it advisable that editors and 
journalists working for PSM do not hold office in a political party or, at least, declare any affiliations (IFJ, 
1999, section 4). 
 
Equally important are the terms of appointment and scope for dismissal. Top management 
positions should be allocated for a fixed term independent of the term of office of the elected government 
and there should be no scope for dismissal on the basis of editorial disagreement (CoE, 2012: para.27; 
IFJ, 1999, Part 3). Members of supervisory bodies should be immune from dismissal or suspension during 
their term of office by any authority other than the authority which appointed them, outside exceptional 
circumstances, such as becoming incapable of carrying out their functions. Subject to any independent 
liability before the courts, members of the board of management should only be accountable for the 
exercise of their functions to the supervisory body (CoE, 1996: Explanatory Memorandum, II.3). 
 
Funding 
 
The ability to provide or withhold finance can be used both by corporations and the state to 
influence PSM content. To protect public service operators from such external pressures, the CoE has 
emphasized the importance of access to adequate long-term funding determined at the national level, as 
well as independence in the management of financial resources (CoE, 2006, Appendix I; CoE, 2009, paras. 
10, 12, 16.1, 17.1). The EP has similarly called for “appropriate, proportionate and stable funding for 
public service media in order to guarantee their political and economic independence” (EP, 2013, para. 
12). The variety of public service models in place means funding can be obtained from different sources, 
both state and commercial (CoE, 2009, para. 15; European Commission, 2009, para. 59). To reduce the 
risk of inappropriate influence in relation to both commercial and public funding, a clear statement in the 
founding documents of the obligation of independence, supported by transparent accounting and effective 
monitoring processes, should be put in place (CoE, 1996, Explanatory Memorandum, para. 63; Levy, 
2012). Special attention needs to be paid to the potential for state advertising and sponsorship to be used 
to influence editorial decisions (EP, 2013, para. 16). 
  
A Comparative Overview of PSBs 
 
The Public Service Remit 
 
The legal frameworks for PSM in the 14 countries reviewed establish more or less comprehensive 
provisions identifying the character, type, and breadth of the public service offer. Mandates, which usually 
take the form of qualitative, but may also include quantitative, requirements, vary considerably on 
account of domestic sociopolitical and cultural conditions. Even so, there are some core features that are 
generally evident. Public service operators are typically required to provide citizens with a wide variety of 
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programs and services that disseminate information and news; foster debate on issues of public interest; 
provide education and entertainment; support the national identity, culture, and language; and promote 
social cohesion, tolerance, and mutual understanding. Requirements to satisfy the interests of different 
audiences and social groups are commonly imposed, coupled with obligations for high professional 
standards. 
 
The public service mission is usually laid down in legislation, but also in public service contracts 
(or charters), concluded on a regular basis with the government, as in Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Italy, 
Slovakia, and the UK. In the UK, the Charter and accompanying Agreement with the BBC are negotiated 
by the executive with the BBC, though by convention Parliament is consulted (UK Parliament, 2015).2 In 
some countries, such as Denmark, regarding DR, there has been a move toward more detailed regulation 
concerning the types of services to be offered (Helles et al., 2011, p. 38). Arguably, the more detailed the 
public service agreement, the more restricted the scope left to operators to make autonomous decisions, 
which could thwart responsiveness to citizens’ evolving needs. On the other hand, detailed content 
requirements could support the independence of PSM, reducing the scope for external intervention.  
 
Although in the pre-Internet era there seemed to be general agreement that a broad public 
service remit was also a sufficiently precise remit, in the post-Internet, multiplatform media environment 
such a consensus has largely faded. From the early 2000s onward, private media have argued for an 
accurately defined public service mission, largely aimed at curbing public operators’ expansion into new 
areas of activity online. The public value frenzy that accompanied such debates crystallized in claims for 
an ex ante assessment of the activities of public operators, aimed at evaluating the societal and market 
impact of envisaged new services online. Adoption of public value tests, already in operation in the UK, 
was, as noted above, actively supported by the Commission (European Commission, 2007, 2008, 2009). 
Besides the UK, public value tests have been legally instituted in the following countries under study: 
Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Belgium (regarding the public service operator in Flanders, VRT).3 
 
The public value tests in these countries vary significantly, including with respect to the bodies 
assigned to conduct them. In Denmark, it is the independent regulator, the Radio and Television Council, 
which is responsible for carrying out both a public value and market impact assessment before the launch 
of any new service or major service changes that are not explicitly covered by DR’s public service contract 
(Helles et al., 2011, pp. 43–44). In Belgium, any new service or activity that is not covered by the 
management contract of VRT requires the explicit permission of the Flemish government (Van Besien, 
2011, pp. 26–27). This must turn for advice to the Flemish Media Council, consisting of experts and 
representatives of the Flemish media community. In the UK, the BBC Board is required to consider the 
impact on competition of any material change to the BBC public services, and under the new Agreement 
with the government any such material change must be approved by the independent regulator Ofcom, 
which may carry out an independent reviewv(Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2016b, clauses 8–
                                                 
2 Public service contracts may also build on broader media policy agreements reached by the political 
parties in Parliament (Helles, Søndergaard & Toft, 2011, pp. 19–20, concerning Danish DR). 
3 For discussion of public value tests elsewhere in Europe, see Donders (2012). 
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12).4 In Germany, responsibility for the test rests with the broadcasting councils, the governing bodies of 
the public service operators (Müller & Gusy, 2011, p. 23). As to the Finnish public service operator YLE, 
when a test is due, an external expert, selected in accordance with public procurement legislation, is 
mandated to launch two consultations on market impact and public value respectively. The ultimate 
decision lies with YLE’s administrative council. 
 
Evidently, the bodies involved in the tests include, besides independent regulators and 
supervisory bodies, government bodies and entities that may have a stake in the outcome of the test. This 
can prove problematic from the perspective of independent assessment (Katsirea, 2011, p. 63). More 
importantly, ex ante evaluation poses a clear challenge to the editorial autonomy and freedom of 
expression of the public operators: proposed services are put to test before they are actually launched 
and, crucially, can be prohibited not on account of public interest concerns that can legitimately restrict 
free speech but on the basis of competition constraints. In some countries, such as Germany, competition 
concerns have led to the outright banning of specific types of service from the public service remit through 
“negative” lists of impermissible online content (Moe, 2010, pp. 211–212; Müller & Gusy, 2011, p. 18). 
Although the exclusion of certain types of service may be legitimate from the perspective of ensuring that 
public operators remain focused on their democratic, social, and cultural remit, the German law prohibits 
the provision of so-called non-program-related press-like services.5 Although this vague concept leaves 
public broadcasters room for interpretation, public service operators are broadly confined to online 
services associated with “traditional” public service radio and television programs. This consequently 
undermines their ability to pursue in a technologically neutral manner their democratic, social, and cultural 
objectives. Similarly, German PSBs are prohibited from transmitting on demand acquired feature films and 
series, which have not been commissioned, or a nationwide service exclusively focused on local news and 
reporting.6  
 
Funding Arrangements 
 
A key indicator of the independence of PSM is their ability to resist interference by those who 
provide funding. Most of the countries studied have introduced a model of mixed funding for their PSM 
that combines public resources with commercial revenue. In some countries, such as Denmark and the 
UK, different PSBs have different funding arrangements. In the UK, Channels 3 and 4 are funded solely 
through advertising, the BBC by license fee. Whereas commercial revenue may derive from a variety of 
sources (i.e., advertising, sponsorship, program sales, merchandising, provision of production services to 
third parties, etc.), the most common public funding instrument is the license fee. However, public 
revenue may also originate directly in the state budget, from taxation or derive from specific public funds 
in the form of subsidies, grants, or concessions.  
 
                                                 
4 Implementing the proposals in Department for Culture, Media and Sport [DCMS], 2016a, p. 65. 
5 Art. 11.d (2), Point 3, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia. 
6 Art. 11.d (5) Point 3, Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia. 
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With the exception of Belgium,7 Bulgaria, Estonia, and Spain, which follow a system of state 
contributions, and Finland, which, since January 2013, funds YLE through taxation (Kuutti, Lauk, & 
Lindgren, 2011, p. 24), all countries reviewed have opted for the license fee method of funding. The 
obligation to pay the fee and its level are commonly laid down in law or, as noted above, multiannual 
public service contracts signed with the government, which can facilitate political influence (regarding the 
UK, see Martinson & Plunkett, 2015). Whereas most countries have traditionally linked payment of the 
license fee to possession of a radio and/or television set, technological evolution, enabling reception by 
means other than a radio or television, has triggered the application of platform-neutral fees tied to 
ownership of any receiving device (see, on the UK, Martinson & Plunkett, 2015). In certain countries, such 
as Greece, the license fee has been based on lump-sum contributions, unrelated to possession of a 
receiving device. Recent changes in Germany also point in this direction (Müller, 2012) in that since 
January 2013 a flat monthly fee has been imposed on households. The fee for businesses is calculated on 
the basis of, inter alia, the number of employees. To avoid evasion, Italy is to collect the license fee 
through electricity bills (Pekic, 2016). 
 
In the majority of countries studied, besides public income, PSM are allowed to draw on 
advertising and/or sponsorship revenue. This can result in advertisers and sponsors gaining undue 
editorial influence and may encourage PSM to maximize ratings among those segments of the population 
of principal interest to advertisers. Such commercial influence runs counter to the international guidelines 
considered above. To counter this influence, Estonia and Finland have excluded their public operators from 
the advertising market. Whereas the Finnish YLE has been prevented from relying on advertising since its 
establishment, as with the BBC in the UK, changes in the legal framework governing the Estonian ERR 
have resulted in the operator’s exit from the advertising market (Harro-Loit & Loit, 2011, p. 16). In Spain, 
in contrast to regional PSBs, the nationwide RTVE has been required to abandon advertising (De la Sierra, 
Guichot, Mantini, Medina, & Sobrino, 2010, p. 400). In other countries, to mitigate commercial influence, 
public service operators have been subjected to stricter advertising regulation in comparison to 
commercial broadcasters.8 Though such measures can enhance the independence of PSM, they also 
benefit the commercial sector. It is important, therefore, that they are not deployed simply to weaken the 
public sector and that any loss in required revenue is compensated for by public funds. 
 
In many countries reviewed, commercial operators, press outlets, and private broadcasters have, 
as noted, criticized PSBs for expanding their online activities using “guaranteed” public income. In the UK, 
the scale of the BBC’s online activities have been particularly controversial, even though domestic services 
do not carry advertising (UK Parliament, 2015). Allegations of unfair competition have also been a factor 
in the move towards increased reliance on public funds in some of the countries reviewed. In Germany, 
the Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting and Telemedia precludes PSBs from offering advertising portals and 
engaging in online advertising. In Croatia, the legislator has limited the amount of advertising that the 
public HRT may carry and thus advertising revenues (Švob-Đokić, Bilić, & Peruško, 2011, p. 22). In some 
                                                 
7 Financial aid granted by the French Community Government in Belgium to RTBF.be comes partly from 
license fees paid by local households.  
8 In Belgium, VRT in Flanders has no right to income received from television advertising, but radio and 
Internet advertising can generate resources, alongside other commercial revenues, up to a certain ceiling. 
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countries, a different trend is discernible, with public funding offered more widely. Thus, license-fee 
revenue supports the Danish Public Service Fund, which subsidizes drama and documentary programs 
broadcast by commercial media (Helles et al., 2011, p. 43). Similarly, the Croatian Fund for the Promotion 
of Diversity and Pluralism of Electronic Media supports the production and broadcasting of public interest 
programs by local and regional radio and television operators (Švob-Đokić et al., 2011, p. 30). In the UK, 
the government proposes the introduction of a contestable public service fund (DCMS, 2016, p. 71). 
 
Management and Supervision 
 
A central feature of the independence of PSM is the ability to operate at arm’s length from 
government and power elites, while being subject to effective supervision by bodies that are shielded from 
political interference. The executive bodies of the public operators in the countries studied consist of 
corporate bodies (management or administrative boards), persons acting in an individual capacity (i.e., 
director general, president), or both. The executive is responsible for the operational management of the 
public operators, which commonly involves developing and implementing a program and budgetary 
strategy, taking organizational decisions and program scheduling. Although the responsibilities assigned to 
the management bodies display considerable similarities, the procedures followed for the nomination and 
appointment of their members vary substantially in the countries reviewed, mainly due to differences in 
political culture and national styles of government. 
 
The risk of political interference is particularly acute in countries with centralized procedural 
arrangements involving the executive and/or legislative branch.9 A pure centralized model, implicating 
only the executive, was until recently in place in Greece: The president, managing director, and other 
members of the management board of ERT used to be appointed by joint decision of the Ministries of 
Finance and State.10 Procedures involving both the executive and the legislative power, as with the Italian 
RAI, the Romanian TVR and the Danish DR, decrease the potential for one-sided political influence. This is 
especially so when the legislative branch is mandated to elect more members than the executive, provided 
that influence is dispersed among the political parties represented in Parliament. The latter is of key 
importance also when appointments are under the sole responsibility of Parliament.11 Increased majority 
voting requirements, in particular, may undermine the centralization of power by the political party (or 
parties) in government. 
 
In some of the countries examined, a mixed procedural model is followed, combining centralized 
with decentralized features. In Turkey, all members of the administrative board of TRT are appointed by 
the cabinet but four are selected on the basis of nominations made by RTÜK, the independent media 
regulator. In the UK, the government has introduced a new unitary board for the BBC, consisting of 14 
                                                 
9 Opportunities for the public operators’ employees to elect representatives may also exist. 
10 They are currently appointed by the Minister of State following a public appointments process and an 
opinion issued by the parliamentary Committee on Institutions and Transparency. 
11 Note that in Belgium the members of the boards of directors of RTBF.be and VRT in the French and 
Flemish Communities are selected by the respective community parliaments in proportion to the strength 
of the political parties therein. 
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members: five of the ten non-executive members are appointed by the government, including the Chair, 
following the public appointment principles (Her Majesty Elizabeth II, 2016, arts. 21–23). The Chair also 
chairs the Board Nomination Committee, which proposes the other five non-executive members to the 
Board for appointment. The Director General is automatically a member of the Board, but the other three 
executive members must similarly be put forward by the Nomination Committee for approval by the Board 
(Her Majesty Elizabeth II, 2016, arts. 24–26). In other countries, insulation from political influence is 
sought via entirely decentralized procedures without the involvement of political elites. In Estonia, it is 
ERR’s own supervisory organ, the broadcasting council, which appoints the broadcaster’s management 
board. In Bulgaria, the management boards of BNR and BNT consist of members appointed by the 
independent media regulator, the Council for Electronic Media (CEM), upon nomination by the operators’ 
director general, who is also elected by CEM. In Denmark, on the other hand, wider societal 
representation is sought: The members of the board of directors of the regional TV2 stations are 
appointed by the board councils, which consist of representatives of each region’s cultural and social life. 
 
Turning to the supervisory organs of the PSBs in the countries under review, these are typically 
responsible for monitoring compliance with public service goals, program standards, ensuring financial 
discipline, and holding the management to account. Occasionally, they are also under an explicit duty to 
safeguard the independence of the public operator. The BBC Board is required to secure the independence 
of the BBC, and prohibited from taking instructions from ‘Government Ministers or any other person’ by 
Article 20(2) of the new 2016 Charter (Her Majesty Elizabeth II, 2016).  
 
Supervision takes place through bodies internal to the public service broadcasters, external, or 
both. A characteristic example of internal supervision can be found in Germany: The supervisory organs of 
the German public operators are the broadcasting councils12 and the administrative councils. The 
broadcasting councils consist of representatives through delegation by various societal groups (i.e., trade 
unions, industry groups, churches, sports, science and cultural associations, universities, etc.) and 
sometimes, pursuant to the relevant state broadcasting act, by representatives of political parties or the 
state government. The members of the administrative councils are elected by the broadcasting councils 
and thus also tend to represent a variety of social groups. Participatory arrangements of this kind favor 
the representation of a wider array of interests and therefore might mitigate the risk of political 
interference, in line with international guidelines. The German Federal Constitutional Court has, however, 
emphasized that such bodies should be as diverse as possible, including representatives from 
nonmainstream bodies; that the independent members should not be subject to direction from political 
parties; and that the proportion of members part of, or close to, the state should be kept to no more than 
a third (German Federal Constitutional Court, 2014). 
 
In other countries, public broadcasters’ activities are monitored externally by independent 
regulators, sometimes with concurrent supervision by Parliament, government, or other bodies (such as 
courts of auditors with regard to financial oversight). Whereas in the UK (for the commercial PSBs), 
Bulgaria, and Turkey, oversight is exercised by independent regulators; in Italy and Romania, the 
                                                 
12 In the case of ZDF, the television council. 
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supervisory duties of the independent regulators go hand in hand with parliamentary control;13 and, in the 
case of Italy, with control by the executive as well.14 Supervisory functions may also be allocated to bodies 
both internal and external to the public operators. In the UK, oversight of the BBC is currently divided 
between the BBC Board and Ofcom. A similar supervisory model can be found in Finland.15  
 
Supervision by the executive and/or the legislative branch creates fertile ground for political 
interference. In Romania, for example, the Parliament may decide not to approve reports submitted by 
TVR and, on this basis, dismiss the TVR board (Ghinea & Avădani, 2011, p. 21). Interference might also 
arise when the independent regulator does not enjoy genuine safeguards (in law or practice) to guarantee 
its own autonomy. Internal bodies, in turn, face the risk of “captured” oversight. This is particularly so 
when the supervisory body enjoys mixed competences, engaging partly in management and partly in 
supervision.  
 
Factors Influencing the Political Independence of Public Service Broadcasting 
 
Given that PSM have often evolved from state broadcasting organizations, it is not surprising that 
their political independence often remains problematic (ECtHR, 2009). Borrowing from Hanretty, political 
independence refers to “the degree to which public service broadcaster employees take day to-day 
decisions about their output or the output of their subordinates, without receiving and acting on the basis 
of instructions, threats or other inducement from politicians, or the anticipation thereof; or considering 
whether the interests of those politicians would be harmed by particular choices about output” (Hanretty, 
2009, p. 76). Institutional, financial and legal arrangements may constrain the attempts by political and 
government elites to influence PSM for their own advantage (Hanretty, 2009, p. 79).  
 
The independence of PSM is likely to be more effectively defended in those countries where the 
operators’ governance structures and appointment procedures are explicitly intended to neutralize 
government control. This is the case where the governance structures reflect the existing balance of 
power among political parties and secure representation for the main social partners and interests. For 
example, in Denmark (regarding the regional TV2 stations), Finland and Germany,16 internal and external 
structures of PSM regulation and governance reflect in roughly proportionate ways the strength of the 
political parties represented in Parliament and/or dominant social groups. At the same time, though, there 
should be scope for representation of wider interests in society (see German Federal Constitutional Court, 
2014). 
 
                                                 
13 In Italy, the Parliamentary Committee for General Guidance and Monitoring of Radio and Broadcasting 
Services monitors RAI’s compliance with PSB principles. In Romania, supervision of is exercised through 
an annual report submitted by TVR to the Parliament’s media committees. 
14 RAI reports each semester to the Department of Communications within the Ministry of Economic 
Development on fulfilment of quantitative content requirements in its management contract. It also 
submits an annual report on all program activities to the same department. 
15 The administrative council of the Finnish YLE is also subject to reporting requirements to Parliament.  
16 On Germany, see Khabyuk (2010).  
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Insofar as the appointment of the management and supervisory bodies of PSM remains in the 
hands of the executive and/or the legislature (i.e., Denmark, for DR and TV2/Denmark, and Finland),17 
there is considerable scope for the government to exert influence through its appointees. Attempts by the 
government and political parties to appoint individuals on the basis of political favoritism are 
counterbalanced by the requirement for expertise and professionalism. For example, appointees to certain 
management and regulatory bodies, such as the Danish Radio and Television Council, must demonstrate 
their expertise in a field relevant to the media, and partly represent social and linguistic groups (as in 
Finland; Benson & Powers, 2011, pp. 26, 28). In Italy, on the other hand, appointment of members to the 
management of RAI by the President of the Republic (upon proposals by the head of government) and 
Minister of the Economy are politically determined, despite being approved by parliamentary commissions. 
Reforms since 2005 to reduce such governmental influence have been watered down (Padovani, 2010).  
 
Spain has also pursued reforms to introduce a regulatory framework that can act as a check on 
government interference in appointments to the management body. In 2006 and 2012, the Parliament 
approved a new regulatory framework that transformed the status of the RTVE into a state-owned 
corporation with “special autonomy.” Yet, while the first reform in 2006 required a degree of cross-party 
consensus for appointment of the Board of Directors (Leon, 2010), the 2012 reform subsequently watered 
this down by allowing a simple parliamentary majority to reach a final decision should parties be unable to 
agree. Despite these reforms, government attempts to interfere with public service broadcasting have 
continued (De la Sierra & Mantini, 2011, pp. 20–21).  
 
In the post-communist countries of CESE, the establishment of PSB took place against the 
background of intense politicization of the state with political parties, business corporations, organized 
interest groups and other actors trying to control various state institutions and resources. In this context, 
particularly strong connections were forged between political parties and the media, which the parties 
then sought to control for partisan ends (Zielonka & Mancini, 2011, pp. 2–3). In Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Romania, and Slovakia, reforms since the 1990s have augmented the ability of PSM to defend their 
independence from the government and dominant political elites only in limited ways. The regulatory and 
governance structures in these countries have not radically distanced public service operators from 
government and political control. In Bulgaria, for example, reforms in 1998 sought to ensure the political 
independence of the public broadcaster BNT, yet the specialized agency NCRT (renamed CEM in 2001) 
established to oversee BNT and to select its general directors is not politically independent as its members 
are appointed by the president and the parliamentary majority (Smilova, Smilov, & Ganev, 2011). In 
Romania, the procedures for appointing members of the nominally independent regulator, the National 
Broadcasting Council (CNA), completely lack transparency. Appointed by the president, the government, 
and the two chambers of Parliament, its members have a clear political affiliation and, on a number of 
occasions, they have been former politicians. 
 
The extent to which state financing undermines the political independence of PSM is determined 
by a number of other financial and administrative factors (O’Hagan & Jennings, 2003, p. 46). Direct state 
                                                 
17 In Denmark, two members are appointed by DR’s employees and three members by TV2/Denmark’s 
employees. 
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subsidies can undoubtedly be used to exert leverage and the plan in Slovakia (2011–2012) to shift from 
license fees, determined by Parliament, to state subsidies was controversial because of concerns about the 
Slovak public operator’s ability to resist political control (Školkay, Hong, & Kutaš, 2011).  Even in 
countries such as the UK, where PSBs enjoy a significant independence, the power of the executive to set 
the license fee can facilitate political pressure (Martinson & Plunkett, 2015). This can be contained by 
incorporating the license fee in multiannual public service contracts that link financing to clear public 
service goals. Such a contract was adopted in Belgium in 1997, and while it has not prevented 
government intervention, it has rendered it less frequent and discretionary. Still, critics argue that 
removing the process of drawing up the public service contract from parliamentary debate renders it less 
transparent (Coppens & Saeys, 2006, p. 271). 
 
Finally, the autonomy of PSM from government interference can be supported through the 
involvement of independent regulatory/advisory and judicial actors. When in 2004 a number of Länder 
governments in Germany refused, for the first time, the license fee increase proposed by the independent 
advisory body, the German Commission for the Determination of the Financial Needs of Broadcasters, the 
issue was referred to the German Federal Constitutional Court. The Court ruled in favor of the public 
broadcasters, holding that the “politically motivated handling of the license fee issue by the Länder had 
been a violation of the principle of broadcasting freedom” (Woldt, 2010, p. 178). 
 
Conclusion 
 
PSM are profoundly shaped by the political, social, and economic systems in which they operate 
(Hallin & Mancini, 2004). We need, therefore, to be alert to how rules and regulatory structures take effect 
in practice and how both shape and are shaped by the broader media ecology in a given member state. At 
the same time, we argue that the adoption of legal provisions and institutional safeguards can make a 
positive difference to the independence of PSM, circumscribing the ever present attempts by political elites 
and governments to tamper with the production of news. International guidelines already identify key 
areas that require attention, notably the process of making appointments to, and operation of, the 
supervisory and management bodies of PSM; funding; and the accountability and transparency not only of 
PSM but of all bodies that make strategic decisions affecting their operation. These guidelines receive only 
patchy recognition in Europe but they remain relevant even as the technology and expectations of the 
mass media undergo profound change. If PSM are to realize their full potential in the future, then renewed 
attention needs to be given to these foundational principles established in the past.  
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